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During the past three decades urban public transport policy has gone through several 
phases. From public ownership and monopoly provision, the eighties and nineties were 
characterized by a strong liberalization of the sector. This experience showed the limits of 
liberalization of the sector in terms of safety, prices and accountability. This paper 
discusses the market failures that justify this claim and the regulatory options available in 
this emerging new role of government, illustrating how they are being used in practice in 
some countries. 
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1. Introduction 
Any review of the perception of best practice in terms of the market structure and 
organization of urban public transport over the last 30 years or so would reveal the 
popularity of a hybrid model, that is a model in which the public and the private sector 
share responsibilities for the delivery of the service.
1 A more careful review would reveal 
an evolving consensus with respect to the optimal degree and form of government 
intervention in this hybrid model.
2 This evolving consensus is particularly obvious in bus 
transport which represents the largest mode of urban transport in the developing world 
since, according the latest data published by the UN (2001), over 40% of all trips to work 
are done by buses in low and middle income countries.  
The new consensus on the organization of the bus services market has roughly 
emerged as follows.
3 During most of the 1970s, public provision and self-regulation were 
the norm but ended with major fiscal difficulties and the consequences of the two major oil 
price shocks. Starting in the 1980s, liberalization and privatization of services became the 
new norm but ended with major safety and environmental problems in addition to some 
social issues resulting from tariff rebalancing in the sector. The result, toward the end of the   2  
1980s, was a wave of policies introduced to mitigate some of the excesses of competition 
by restricting entry in the sector. Since the end of the 1990s, the state seems to be returning 
firmly, at least as a regulator and as a facilitator of modal integration.
4 
The main purpose of this paper is to discuss why this last stage may be the most 
rational from an economic point of view, thus confirming the current intuition of many 
policymakers in the sector. The general perception is that the liberalization experience has 
demonstrated that there are indeed limits to competition and that the industry is 
characterized by many market failures which require regulatory intervention. 
  The paper emphasizes two sets of regulatory issues. The first is related to the 
industrial organizational of a competitive bus market since it drives the efficiency potential 
of the public transport services. They address the potential market failures that may plague 
this industry, including pollution and congestion externalities, network effects, the need to 
coordinate the large number of agents involved and the interactions with other urban 
planning issues.
5  The second set of regulatory issues flow from the first one. Indeed, if  
regulatory intervention is warranted, the challenge is to intervene without compromising 
the efficiency benefits of competition among private providers. 
  The paper addresses these issues as follows. Section 2 relies on a presentation of the 
experience of Santiago, the capital of Chile, as an illustration of the typical ways in which 
the regulatory issues tend to emerge in practice. Section 3 provides a detailed review of the 
main sources of market failures in the bus industry that would justify a regulatory role for 
government in developing countries, including excessive entry, social inefficient frequency 
decisions and agency issues resulting from various types of ownership structures in the 
sector Section 4 presents the various possible regulatory responses to these problems. 
Section 5 shows how these solutions are converging into a new hybrid model and how they   3  
are being implemented in practice in the context of the recent  reforms of urban transport in 
Bogotá, Colombia.  The last section summarizes the risks associated with the new model.  
 
2.  An illustration: evolution of the role of government in the bus sector in Santiago 
The recent history of urban public transport in Santiago, Chile, provides a good illustration 
of the typical evolution of urban transport policies and of the reasons behind the changes 
that have occurred regarding best practice in this field. This history can be divided into 
three distinct periods. The first period, ending in 1979, was characterized by heavy state 
intervention, both as a service provider (with the company Empresa de Transportes 
Colectivos) and as regulator of prices, routes, and permits for private operators. During this 
period there was a chronic shortage and low quality of services. The social costs of this 
insufficiency were in the form of long waiting times for bus arrival and congested buses.  
The second period began in 1979 when the sector was liberalized with the 
introduction of free entry, freedom to establish routes and, beginning in 1983, freedom for 
each operator to set tariffs. The rationality for these reforms laid in the conviction that a 
free market would generate an optimal level and quality of services. Competition, it was 
thought, would guarantee an efficient level of prices. Unfortunately, in practice things did 
not turn out as expected.  
  During this second period, there was a significant increase in the number of buses 
and the geographical coverage of the system. Between 1979 and 1983, the number of buses 
increased by 40%, from 5,185 to 7,278. This increase and the problems it generated spurred 
a U-turn in the liberalization reforms. Between 1984 and 1988 entry was restricted, 
although illegal entry persisted and the number of buses reached close to 11,000 by 1988.   4  
In 1988, just before the transition to democracy, the sector was again completely liberalized 
and the number of buses reached its peak of 13.698 in 1990.  
  The effects of liberalization clearly generated benefits to users as waiting times were 
reduced and the distance to the nearest bus route was shortened. As the process continued 
average capacity utilization dropped by 55% and 32% respectively in buses and taxi buses 
during this period.
6 In spite of this drop and of the associated large number of operators in 
the system, the users saw the benefits of improved service offset by a real tariffs increase of 
almost 100% between 1979 and 1990.
7 This increase was not related to increases in fuel 
prices. In fact,  with the exception of 1986, fuel prices throughout the period were lower 
than their  original level in 1979.  This behavior of tariffs during the liberalization period 
implies that competition was not successful in curbing market power. 
In addition to these price increases, the reforms were beginning to be associated 
with major quality problems. Indeed, the increase in the number of buses, their reliance on 
diesel fuel and the increase in the average age of buseswith lower technological 
standardstransformed the bus sector in one of the main generators of congestion and air 
pollution externalities in Santiago. By the late eighties, Santiago’s atmosphere was one of 
the most polluted in the world.
8  The bus industry was not the only source of air pollution 
but it was one of the leading contributors. Congestion was related to the fact that 80% of 
bus routes passed through the 7 main arteries of the city and clogged the main roads of the 
central urban area (Malbran, 2001).   
   Towards the end of the eighties, the high tariffs, the high average age of buses, the 
low average capacity utilization of an oversized bus stock, together with the environmental 
and congestion externalities served to finally put an end to the free market experience. In   5  
1991, new regulations were introduced that ushered in a new hybrid model for the 
organization of the industry in Santiago. Under a new tendering system, the authorities 
established the route coverage of services, while tariffs were determined through the 
competitive bidding process (subject to periodic adjustments for changes in input costs). 
The competitive tendering processalthough not perfectserved to stop and revert the 
real tariff escalation of the eighties, lower the number of buses and increase the average 
capacity utilization rate.
9  
By 2001 there were only 8,179 buses in operation, in spite of the fact that the 
average number of passengers during a working day increased from 3,575,942 million to 
4,275,913 million between 1991 and 2001.
10 Occupancy of buses doubled during this 
period. The average age of buses dropped to 6 years and over half of the current stock 
meets EPA-91 or EPA-94 emission standards. Service qualitymeasured by network 
coverage and waiting timeswas not affected by the reforms since the authorities did not 
modify the existing route design when tendering was introduced. Waiting times at bus stops 
averaged only 4 minutes (Ministerio de Obras Públicas, Transporte y Telecomunicaciones, 
1997).  
The new role of government was further fine-tuned during the nineties when several 
other norms and regulations were introduced, including a limit of the maximum age of 
buses (10 years), emission standards, bus types (automatic transmission), among others, 
which helped to increase the quality of service and a reduction in the environmental 
externalities caused by the sector.  
Although Chile’s bus services are now firmly grounded in a hybrid regime with a 
strong regulatory commitment to address market failures, there are still several aspects of   6  
the system inherited from the free market experience that have not been corrected but are 
being worked on. Among the remaining problems are the following. First, when 
concessions were introduced no effort was made to optimize the network configuration nor 
introduce some sort of tariff integration. Therefore, currently too many routes overlap, 
individual services are usually very longthe average length of a route is 63 kilometers 
(EMG (2002))and tariff integration is nonexistent except for some minor integration 
between some bus services and the underground metro system. These features generate 
aggregate economic inefficiencies in the transport sector as discussed further below. 
Another consequence is that there are still an excessive number of buses in the system 
compared to an optimized network (SECTRA, 2002; Vivanco, 2002).  
Second, since operators still earn their revenue from ticket collection, buses still 
have strong incentives to compete head to head on the road. Besides the difficulty this 
creates for an orderly bus-stop designbuses stop anywhere generating more frequent 
stop-and-goes, increasing travel times and thus further undermining the economic 
efficiency of the transport system as a wholesafety is the greatest emerging problem. In 
2001, there were 7,392 accidents in the Santiago urban area where a bus was involved; of 
the 5,699 injured people in those accidents 112 were fatalities. On average then there is one 
death every three days in an accident involving a bus from the transport system. To put 
these number in perspective, this is larger than the total number of fatalities from bus 
accidents observed in Australia between 1990 and 1998. 
11   
These pending issues illustrate some of the problems inherited from the liberalization 
experience. The weakness of regulation was a large one but certainly not the only one. A 
related factor, possibly one of the main obstacles to further reform of the organization and   7  
regulation of the bus system, has been the pressure from the bus owner’s lobby.
12  As in 
many countries,  once the bus system had been liberalized,  new strong interest groups were 
created by the new operators and they made future reforms more difficult.
13  
 
3.  Market failures in the urban transport industry 
More generally, what Santiago’s story reveals is that market failures in the bus industry 
are not only the result of environmental and congestion externalities but also the 
consequences of the economic characteristics of the business. The network characteristics 
of the industry, the peculiarities of demand for journeys, the specific organizational 
structure chosen for the delivery of the service and major governance issues can indeed 
result in many other forms of market failures.
14 Policymakers and the general public are 
typically concerned with the need to regulate to minimize congestion and environmental 
externalities related to public transport.
15 Safety concerns are also very present in the policy 
agenda.
16 However, the failures related to the economic characteristics of the industry may 
also justify a regulatory intervention even in the absence of the more traditional congestion 
and environmental problems as reviewed next.  
3.1 The lack of curb rights 
The street curbs and bus stops where vehicles pick up their passengers are public 
property and thus a ‘common property’ resource for all transport companies, even informal 
ones. According to Klein, Moore y Reja (1997), this is the main market failure in urban bus 
transport and explains many of the failures of this industry. Their argument is interesting 
but its relevance depends on the characteristics of the demand for public transport. There 
are transport markets where the demand for public transport depends on the prior existence 
of a regular service, with predetermined schedules and a high quality of service. In these   8  
markets a company must invest in these characteristics, possibly by operating at a loss for a 
period of time, in order to induce demand for public transport. However, if a company 
undertakes this investment and generates the demand for the service, a competitor (formal 
or informal, or even private vehicles looking for passengers in order to use high occupancy 
lanes in certain cities) can take away the original company’s clientele at the points where 
passengers congregate. Since curb sides are public property, and thus there is no way to 
avoid this ‘business stealing’, the company cannot recoup its original investment. Knowing 
this, the company does not invest in the first place, demand is not induced and the public 
transport service may disappear.   
There are two solutions to the above problem. Klein, Moore y Reja (1997) propose 
a system of transferable curb rights. Under this scheme only companies that own rights 
over some curb space can pick up passengers at those points. These rights can be sold or 
rented, thus assuring that the most efficient companies own these rights. Klein, Moore y 
Reja (1997) suggest the use of video cameras to enforce these curb rights. The second 
solution is to give one operator exclusive rights over a route and then to enforce this 
exclusivity by keeping out potential informal operators. In order to avoid the abuse of 
market power by the exclusive operator, competitive tendering should be used to determine 
the franchise operator and fare levels.    
Considering the country specific conditions, the lack of curb rights may help to 
explain the decline of public transport in some cities in developed countries. When high 
quality and scheduled transport services are preyed upon by interlopers, the formal high 
quality service declines, thus potential passengers, unsure of the time the next bus will pass 
by their stop, may prefer to use another mode of transport. As demand decreases, service 
supply decreases further and a downward spiral of decline of the bus market may ensue. If   9  
the market does not disappear it will be dominated by the generally lower quality 
interlopers.  
However, as a general explanation of the woes confronting bus markets in 
developing countries, the lack of curb rights argument is less convincing as a generalized 
explanation for the urban transport problem. In most developing countries, many 
individuals do not have an alternative mode of transport except by buses.
17 In these markets 
demand may be ‘thick’ in the sense that no prior investment in a regular scheduled service 
is required in order to induce demand. Moreover, the assignment of curb rights may be 
more complex in congested urban centers, a common feature of developing countries, 
because time schedules may be close to impossible to meet.
18 In many large cities, such as 
Santiago, Manila, Dakar or Bangkok, the problem is not one of disappearing public 
transport services, but of excessive entry and frequency, especially during off-peak hours.
19   
Note that even in the case of markets with ‘thick’ demands, the lack of curb rights 
may not be discarded completely as an explanation in developing countries. First, the curb 
rights argument may be relevant for the inexistence of private services in lightly traveled 
routes or during night or early morning hours.  Second, it may explain certain distortions in 
the investment decision of operators that may degrade the quality of service. Since 
operators must compete for passengers at the curb, investments that allow operators to 
compete more effectively will be undertaken. One example may be the strong preference 
operators in Santiago have for vehicles with manual gear systems rather than automatic 
gears.
20 The control and faster acceleration provided by manual gears may be an advantage 
for racing and positioning vehicles in the competition for passengers at curbs.
21 Another 
distortion may be the incentive for introducing faster and smaller buses which are more 
maneuverable compared to their larger and slower counterparts. Although from a private   10  
point of view the smaller buses may be preferable, the additional congestion, pollution and 
higher investment costs per seat capacity may not justify this decision from a social 
viewpoint.   
3.2 Efficient entry and fares 
Besides the lack of curb rights, there are some other reasons why a free market in urban 
transport may not provide the efficient number of services in developing countries. One of 
the main one may be the underestimation of the importance of fare regulation to achieve a 
socially efficient level of service in the sector. Fares tend to be controlled politically to 
ensure their affordability but they also may need to be regulated or subsidized in order to 
induce the right entry/exit decisions and frequency decisions by private operators.   
Congestion, pollution and other externalities are clearly emerging as a growing problem as 
well for the design of the optimal organization of the bus industry and are increasingly 
generally recognized as such. Less appreciated maybe is the importance of “agency” 
problems in the design of the industry structure. In order to formalize the ideas of this 
section and show the interactions between the various forms of market failure presented,  
we first develop a very simple transport model that gives basic insights into the forces 
behind excessive or insufficient entry and then discuss each market failure in some detail. 
3.2.1  A simple transport model 
Consider a transport system that operates exclusively on buses during a certain 
cyclical period of time (say one day, one week, or one month). During this period, N(p) 
passengers arrive uniformly to take a bus, where p is the price of one trip. B is the number 
of buses in circulation. Assume also that each firm owns only one bus that is operated only 
once per period. There are no operation costsagain an assumption that does not change   11  
the resultsbut there is a fixed cost of F per period. This fixed cost can be the capital value 
of the bus or terminal cost. If the arrival of these buses is equally spaced, the demand for a 
particular bus will be N/B, since it receives all passengers that arrive (uniformly) at the bus 















This implies that if there are B
p buses, there are no private financial incentives for 
additional entry and each firm is obtaining a normal rate of return on its investment.  
  However, this number of buses may not be socially optimal if there are market 
failures of the type discussed here. For instance, a good planner would also take into 
account the effect of the number of buses on the average waiting time of passengers with a 
cost for a passenger of c per unit of time. On average, a passenger will have to wait T/2B 
time units before he can board a bus, where T is the time it takes a bus to complete the 
circuit. Therefore, the social welfare function is given by the sum of the user and operator 
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The main point of this derivation is that depending on the specific parameter values that 
characterize the market, the socially optimal number of buses could be smaller or larger 
that the private equilibrium computed earlier.  
















This result will depend on two effects. The ratio of fixed costs to revenues (the second 
term) represents the excess entry effect typical of differentiated goods models. The higher 
the fare is (assuming demand is inelastic) the higher revenues are and thus the higher the 
excess entry and the duplication of fixed costs. Thus, for high fares, the social optimal level 
of buses will be lower than the private equilibrium, independently of congestion or 
environmental externalities. 
The last term represents the ‘waiting time externality’ well known to transport 
specialists . Mohring (1972) argued that private operators would supply too little service (in 
terms of frequency) since they do not take into account the social benefits of the reduction 
in waiting times of all passengers as additional buses are run on a network. If an extra bus 
is put into service, there will be an added private cost that the firm must recoup. However, 
the extra bus will decrease the interval between buses for the whole route. For example, if 5 
buses pass uniformly each hour through a given point in the network, there will be a 12-
minute interval between buses. Passengersif they arrive uniformly to take a bus at that 
spotwill wait on average 6 minutes before they can board. If an extra bus is put into 
service, the time interval between buses will fall to 10 minutes, and the average waiting 
time to 5 minutes. Therefore, all passengersindependently of whether they actually use   13  
the new buswill gain an extra minute in the form of less waiting time. This is the positive 
externality created by the additional bus. For a high waiting time cost parameter to fare 
levels there will be an under-provision of services in the private equilibrium compared to 
the social optimal level.  
3.2.2  Too much or too little entry? 
Both effects point to an over provision of services in a private “commercial” 
equilibrium when fares are high. Why could it be likely that in a competitive equilibrium 
fares will be above efficient levels? The argument is the familiar in the study of horizontal 
differentiated product markets and applies to buses. Indeed, while buses going to different 
destinations are not perfect substitutes and even buses passing the same final destination of 
a passenger may not be perfect substitute, in some ways, the bus industry can be seen as 
one in which horizontally differentiated products are being sold. The main source of this 
differentiation stems from the existence of a time lapse between the arrival of buses, or 
headway between buses. An individual may prefer taking the first bus that arrives at a stop 
rather than wait for the next one, even if there is a positive probability that this next bus is 
cheaper. Thus, the bus that just arrives at the stop has some ‘captive’ clients, which implies 
that it has some market power to raise tariffs.
22 Raising tariffs, however, creates excessive 
returns to investment and spurs the entry of new firms or buses beyond the socially efficient 
level. Evans (1987) uses a theoretical horizontal differentiation model, along the lines of 
Salop (1979), to show that a competitive equilibrium will imply high tariffs and excessive 
entry. Furthermore, some authors, such as Gómez-Ibañez (1999), have argued that in 
practice the ‘waiting time externality’ is likely to be small in quantitative terms. When 
buses pass at a high frequency, the gains from a reduction in the headway between buses is   14  
likely to be small. When frequencies are low, it is likely that passengers will learn to 
schedule their trips better in order to avoid waiting long at a stop.   
  Thus, it may be likely that the excessive entry effect may dominate, especially in 
developed countries where the value of time costs may be low. One symptom that 
excessive entry has occurred is that a considerable number of buses will be running almost 
empty, something that is still observed in Santiago.
23 Also, the fact that price competition is 
not very strong in bus markets has been widely documented. For instance, Klein, Moore y 
Reja (1997), in their review of the British competitive experience concluded that ‘it has 
been rare in the British experience for companies to compete by offering lower fares. 
Rather, real bus fares increased 17 percent between 1986 and 1994. Instead of lower fares, 
companies chose to offer more frequent service than their competitors’.
24  
  There may also be another phenomenon generating an excessive number of buses in 
a competitive transport system when there are fixed schedules. If there is an incumbent 
provider or a cartel (in the case of Santiago it could have been the operators association) 
then they may have an incentive to preempt entry by competitors. This preemption strategy 
implies ‘filling’ all the possible routes of the network in order to make entry by a small 
rival unprofitable and may also result in too many buses in operation.
25 
3.2.3  Congestion and other externalities 
Ultimately, whether there is excess supply in the bus industry is an empirical matter 
that needs to be analyzed with reference to particular experiences and circumstances. In 
Bangkok, for instance, the traffic averages a mere 13kmph but the bus system averages 
only 9kmph.
26 The problem is related to the fact that buses get stuck in traffic because the 
city’s transport policy does not cater to the specific needs of the bus industry. From a 
conceptual point of view, this points to additional influences on the optimal number of   15  
buses. In particular, if congestion and environmental costs are considered and these 
externalities are proportional to the number of buses on the network, then the socially 
optimal number of buses may have to be lower still. This implies that the possibility that a 
free market will result in excessive, rather than insufficient, entry is greater.  
There is an interesting dichotomy here between developed and developing 
countries. Whereas in the former the modal split is usually heavily biased towards private 
cars, in the latter public transport accounts for the majority of trips. For example, a recent 
report by NERA and TIS.PT (2001) reviewed the public transport system in 9 cities of 
developed countries. They found that public transport usually accounts for less than 25% of 
trips (the highest share of public transport was found in Zurich, 37%) in these cities. Private 
car transport, on the other hand, accounts for well over 50% of trips
27. This is in stark 
contrast to developing countries, where in a city such as Santiago, Chile, 61% of trips are 
undertaken on public transport according to the 2001 Origin and Destiny Survey. 
The modal split will have an influence on the causes of congestion and pollution. In 
a developing country where buses are the main source of urban transport, these will have a 
greater responsibility for congestion and pollution.
28 This argument is reinforced by 
considering that in developing countries bus technology is often older and more polluting 
than in developed countries. It is possible then that in developing countries a free market 
may provide an excessive supply of services (due to these externalities) while in a 
developed country they are a solution to these same externalities. The policy 
recommendations must then be very different in each case. While in the latter subsidies to 
public transport may be justified in order to increase services, in developing countries 
efforts may be needed to rationalize the public transport system.  
   16  
3.3 Agency  problems 
The last source of market failure commonly encountered in the sector and that may 
entail regulatory intervention is associated with incentives problems built in the design of 
contracts given to drivers in a competitive market. Indeed, in a competitive bus market, the 
number of passengers using a particular bus is partly a function of the effort the driver 
makes to seek potential passengers on the road, stop to pick them up (usually not at a 
formal bus stop) and in general try to ‘beat’ other buses for this client. The natural 
“commercial” solution for this incentive problem is for the owner (principal) to design a 
contract for the driver (agent) that aligns the latter’s incentives to his objectives. In this 
context, this means that drivers are paid on a variable salary that depends on the number of 
tickets sold.    
Although paying drivers based on the number of passengers collected makes sense 
as a private solution to the incentive problem faced by bus owners, from a social 
perspective it has several negative effects. The ensuing competition on the road between 
buses vying for passengers can create enormous safety problems, as described earlier in the 
case of Santiago. It also makes it very difficult to design a rational system of bus stops, 
since drivers will have a strong incentive to pick up passengers anywhere between stops. 
Frequency problems are also created by this structure as drivers use a strategy of ‘head-
running’ (running just ahead of competitors) or wait until a competitor appears before 
undertaking the route.    
Paying drivers a fixed wage rather than a variable wage is one way to eliminate the 
above problems. However, this will not arise naturally in a competitive bus industry, since 
a unilateral change of driver’s contract by one company will usually entail an economic 
loss.
29 Even imposing this by decree to all bus companies would be difficult. As long as   17  
owner’s profits are related to the number of passengers carried, there will be a strong 
incentive to pay drivers, either formally or informally, based on the number of passengers 
picked up.  
Save very strict traffic monitoring, the only way to avoid the safety, congestion and 
other problems related to competition on the road is to break the link between profits and 
passenger carried. This is why in many regulatory experiences around the world, including 
Bogotá (see below) and London, bus companies are paid according to quality variables or 
schedule completion rather than passengers carried. However, this in turn requires some 
system of revenue sharing between bus companies that may be difficult to achieve without 
heavy regulatory intervention. In addition, this policy option has the draw-back that 
operators may have the incentive to reduce costs by lowering the number of frequencies 
served or not stopping at all bus stops. However, inexpensive modern geographical 
positioning system technology is now available to monitor the compliance with route 
scheduling of operators. Therefore, technological change has made it possible to pay 
operators according to variables other than the number of passengers carried (for example 
the compliance with route schedules and other quality measures) without a significant 
change in the service provided to passengers.  
Revenue collection by drivers or other personnel on buses can also generate 
inefficiencies through a more subtle channel. When drivers or another employee on the bus 
must collect fares, there is the possibility that these employees will not report all revenue 
earned to the owner. Although this can be monitored by inspectors who check that 
passenger have been given tickets, full effective policing is costly. In fact, in Santiago 
owners and analyst agree that drivers supplement their incomes by around 20% through this 
type of fraud.
30     18  
This possibility of fraud by drivers makes it harder for bus owners to delegate the 
operation of buses to hired employees. Thus, one tends to observe that bus owners tend to 
be drivers also, or drivers are close relatives of the bus owners. The monitoring problem 
described here is one reason why in many cities in the developing world, private bus 
companies tend to be small, informal, and family oriented businesses. In Santiago, the 
average number of buses per owner is 2.11. Over 70% of buses are owned by entrepreneurs 
who own five or less buses. 
31  
  Authors such as Nash (1988) have argued that in a competitive bus market 
economies of scope or scale will not be exploited because of the transaction costs involved 
in coordinating schedules, integrating services and fares, and agreeing on a revenue sharing 
scheme between numerous private operators. This argument, however, is not fully 
convincing because there are many examples where a competitive market results in an 
efficient exploitation of these economies, specifically through mergers and vertical or 
horizontal integration. A good example is the airline industry where private companies 
have adopted a scope and hub system in order to exploit economies of density.
32 However, 
the diseconomies of size that arise due to the monitoring costs of a large fleet of buses 
when drivers are responsible for revenue collection, and which generates an atomized 
ownership structure, may make it difficult to exploit potential economies of density or scale 
in an urban transport network. In fact, preliminary work undertaken in Santiago show that 
there are large economies of density still to be exploited.
33 
 
4.  New Regulatory instruments to cut the risks of market failure.  
The previous section implies that there are four main regulatory challenges in the 
regulation of the bus industry which form the backbone of the new emerging hybrid model.   19  
  The first is to design and integrate the transport network in order to exploit 
economies of density and scale without compromising the system’s coverage.
34 The 
necessary transfer infrastructure must be built and some system of tariff integration must be 
introduced (unless there is one operator for all services and relevant transport modes). It 
will usually also be convenient from a social point of view to create exclusive bus lanes on 
roads. This will guarantee that the lower travel times of an optimized system are not eroded 
away by an increase in private automobile journeys.  
Second, some regulatory control must be exercised on entry decisions and 
frequencies, and tariffs must be regulated.  
Third, operators’ revenue must be decoupled from the number of passengers carried 
in order to avoid the negative effects that result from competition for passengers on the 
streets. This requires some integrated revenue collection system, independent of operators, 
which can then distribute these resources among firms. This has an interesting implication 
for the ownership structure of the bus companies. They will have to become larger and 
more formal enterprises, capable of raising working capital in order to operate in the short 
run since they will not receive revenues from fares on a continual daily basis.
35 In addition, 
the authorities would have to setup some system to monitor service compliance.  
Finally, bus quality and technological specifications will need to be imposed in order 
to reduce environmental externalities and raise service quality.   
It would seem that all of the above recommendations point to a return to the old 
model of monopoly provision of bus services, possibly by a public operator. However, the 
emerging hybrid model takes into account one of the important lessons of past experience: 
the need to guarantee the productive efficiency of the provision of transport services. Public   20  
provision as well as subsidies is not currently favored by policy makers due to their 
negative incentives for efficiency.
36   
    Naturally, direct competition and free entry into the industry is one mechanism to 
foster productive efficiency. However, it raises the problems identified in Section 3. There 
are however alternatives to direct competition that would promote efficiency while at the 
same time preserving the benefits of a centrally integrated and coordinated bus industry. 
When entry is restricted, a regulator wanting to set fares faces an asymmetry of information 
problem. The companies that are to be regulated have better information concerning the 
characteristics of the routes, the actual and potential costs of serving them, the costs of 
providing different service qualities as well as many other economic and technological 
variables that determine the efficient cost structure. Therefore, in many ways there is a 
direct analogy in the promotion of efficiency in this setting and the regulation of natural 
monopolies in utility industries.  
4.1 Combining  restrictions  with  competition for the market 
Restricting head to head competition does not mean that the market cannot be 
competitive. It has been long recognized that in some circumstances competition for the 
market is a good substitute for competition in the market. Tendering bus routes can be a 
powerful regulatory instrument to address the asymmetry of information problems that 
arise from the need to pick among potential providers of services.   
 In utility industries such as water and electricity, the use of auctions to set prices is 
limited by the fact that assets usually last many decades and are sunk which requires 
frequent tariff revision. However, in the urban transport sector, where assets are much 
shorter lived it is possible to set price conditions for a similar period as the life of assets. In 
addition, since there is usually a secondary market for used buses these investments are not   21  
sunk, which means that incumbents must not be compensated for their undepreciated 
investment if they lose a contract. Therefore, tendering bus routes is much more common in 
this sector than in other regulated utility sectors
37. 
Besides Santiago, Bogotá and London, many other transit authorities use tendering 
as a way to assign operators to serve previously defined network routes.
38 There is enough 
experience in the tendering of bus routes to state that this regulatory scheme is indeed quite 
feasible. The potential gains from tendering can be substantial. In Santiago, the tendering 
system reverted the tariff escalation phenomenon that characterized the deregulation period. 
In London, it has been estimated that tendering reduced operating costs per bus kilometer 
significantly. Estimates range from 20% gross of administrative costs or 14% net of 
administrative costs (Glaister, 1998) to 35% (White, 1995).  
There are several ways to tender a route contract. In the case of Santiago, contracts 
are tendered for a 5-year period based on a multi-variable selection criterion, which 
includes the fare offered by a bidder in addition to certain quality variables. In England, 
two basic systems were used to tender three-year contracts. One is to award the contract to 
the bidder that offers the minimum subsidy. In this case, the firm receives revenue directly 
from passengers and the subsidy covers the estimate revenue shortfall compared to costs. 
The second system is based on a gross cost basis in which bids are received for the gross 
amount of transfers that the firm  wants to undertake the service. In this case, the company 
does not retain any revenues from fares (or may not even be responsible for collecting fares 
as in the case of Bogotá) and funds its operation entirely from the transfers.  
There is some evidence that the last alternative lowers overall costs and transfers 
more (White and Tough, 1995). This is because with the minimum subsidy scheme, 
operators still face revenue risk from fluctuations in demand. This revenue risk decreases   22  
the interest of small operators for contracts thus lowering competition at the tendering 
stage. Bidders will also include a risk premium in bids to compensate for the added risk, 
increasing transfers compared to the gross cost type contract.       
The gross cost contract also has the advantage that a company’s revenue is not 
directly related to the number of passengers transported, thus competition on the road is 
avoided. However, it lowers the incentives for companies to seek passengers or otherwise 
stimulate demand by providing a high quality service. Therefore, if different routes do not 
overlap too much, there is effective traffic control policing and individual drivers within a 
firm coordinate their scheduling and traffic safety and other risks of competition on the 
road may be low. In this case, a system that leaves some revenue risk to firms (minimum 
fare or subsidy contracts) may be preferable to give firms an incentive to meet its timetable 
and provide a high quality service to users. However, in developing countries where traffic 
safety is an issue a gross cost contract that rewards a firm according to their compliance 
with reestablished service provisions may be preferable. As noted above, there is now 
relatively inexpensive technology to centrally monitor bus traffic and position. 
4.2  Combining entry restriction with yardstick competition  
While tendering is clearly an attractive instrument it is not always feasible. For 
example, there may be political obstacles to introducing tendering, especially if other types 
of contracts have traditionally been used and these have performed relatively well. Another 
possible reason why tendering may not be effective is that there may not be enough firms to 
guarantee sufficient competition during the process, perhaps because firms have an ability 
to collude.
39 Therefore, it is relevant to examine the performance of alternative regulatory 
contracts on productive efficiency of transport firms.   23  
The ability to use yardstick competition or benchmarking is clearly an attractive 
alternative to tendering. It is commonespecially in the transport industrythat regulators 
simultaneously regulate several services in contiguous spatial markets. Regulators then 
have a powerful tool at their disposal if they can compare or benchmark firms operating in 
the different markets. The use of benchmarking or yardstick competition can, if well 
applied, overcome the informational disadvantage of the regulator and in the limit can be 
used to reach a first best outcome (symmetric information). 
The principal difficulty in applying yardstick or benchmarking type regulations is 
that firms may not be directly comparable. The regulator must then strip-out the variation 
of costs across companies that are due to legitimate differences among companies (in the 
urban transport setting this could be different route types, congestion levels, peak demand 
characteristics and other exogenous influences on costs) before comparing or benchmarking 
them. Naturally, companies have incentives to convince regulators that they are very unique 
and thus ‘non-comparable’ to other companies. 
In spite of the above difficulties, there is at least one experience of the use of 
yardstick type competition in the bus industry.
40  In the late eighties,  some counties in 
Norway started adopting a standard-cost model to determine annual transfers. In such a 
system, the county and the companies agree upon a set of criteria for calculating costs of 
operating a bus-network. It is a linear model that links driver costs, fuel costs, and 
maintenance costs to the number of bus kilometers produced for different categories of 
routes (from inner-city, low speed to long distance, high speed routes). Given fares and 
route schedules, the standard-cost model determines the level of transfers that is granted by 
the regulator. This increase the incentive power of the regulatory scheme. Once the criteria   24  
are set, realized costs by one company that happen to deviate from the standard-cost 
figures, will not affect the level of its next annual lump sum transfer. This gives the 
standard-cost model a flavor of yardstick competition (see Shleifer, 1985). The main 
characteristic of yardstick competition is that transfers be based on a benchmark estimated 
on the basis of cost performance of a larger set of companies.  Dalen and Gómez-Lobo 
(2002a) apply an econometric stochastic cost frontier approach to an 11-year panel of 
Norwegian bus company data and show that the yardstick type contract (standard cost 
model) increases cost efficiency of firms. In addition, there are dynamic effects to the use 
of yardstick contracts. Costs are lower the longer the contract has been in effect. However, 
the measured impacts tend to be small.  
 4.3 Offering menus of contracts to the operators.  
There may be occasions when neither tendering nor yardstick competition is feasible. In 
this case the problem faced by the regulator is identical to a natural monopoly situation 
where he must regulate a single natural monopoly under asymmetric information. The new 
theory of regulation offers a normative framework for regulatory policies in such 
contexts.
41 What are the implications of the theory for policymakers? The first is that 
offering just one type of contract is not optimal (such as a Price-Cap in some counties in 
Norway). Regulators should try to offer a menu of options and allow firms to self-select 
according to their private information. This has seldom been the case in practice. There are 
very few experiences where regulators formally offer a menu of options to firms.
42 
However, it could be that informally, during a negotiation stage, the regulator offers a menu 
of such contracts.
43 
It is interesting to note that several authors have tried to apply the theoretical results 
of the optimal second best contract under asymmetric information to the urban transport   25  
sector. From a theoretical point of view there is the work of Pedersen (1994). On the other 
hand, Wunsch (1994) actually attempts to derive the optimal contract for transit firms 
through a mix of econometrics and calibration. He uses data on 177 mass transit firms in 
Europe to estimate the distribution of the asymmetry of information cost parameters of 
firms. In his words “...the asymmetry of information between the regulator and the agent is 
assumed to be limited to the unexplained variance of a cost estimation based on a cross-
section of 177 transit firms”. Therefore, he estimates a cross-section cost function 
conditioned on the characteristics of each transit system and obtains that the confidence 
interval around fitted values has a standard error of about 15% of costs. He the uses this 
information, plus some calibrated parameters for other functions to calculate the optimal 
menu of contracts to offer firms. 
Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002), in their study of the public transit system in France, 
use a structural approachpreviously explored by Dalen and Gómez-Lobo (1995)to 
recover firm’s underlying cost efficiency distribution. They then model the effects of the 
introduction of an optimal regulatory contract, including route tendering. 
 
5. Towards a solution in the real world: the experience of Bogotá, Colombia
44 
The case of Bogotá illustrates how with political will and a well-structured project it 
is possible to radically improve the transport system in a short period of time. The reforms 
in Bogotá took 36 months to implement.  
During the nineties Bogotá, the capital of Colombia, struggled with many of the 
problems alluded to in the previous section. Buses competed vigorously for passengers in 
the streets (called the “the war of the cents” by Colombians) generating unnecessary traffic   26  
risks and a chaotic system of stops and goes. High congestion generated velocities as low as 
10 kmh during peak periods. Even short trips would sometimes take considerable time. In 
1998, it was estimated that the average trip took 1 hour and 10 minutes. The average age of 
buses was 14 years in 1998 and the service quality they could offer low. The average 
occupancy rate was 45%.  It has been estimated that 70% of particular matter emissions 
from mobile sources could be attributed to the bus system. 
Towards the end of the last decade the mayor of Bogotá undertook a radical reform 
of the transport system in the center of the city. The reform was organized around what 
came to be called the TransMilenio Project that became operational in December 2000, 
only two years after it was first proposed. This project is based on a system of exclusive 
bus lanesalong the busiest corridors of the cityto be used by bus operators. Private 
concessionaires, chosen through a competitive tendering process, operate these central 
corridors. An extensive network of feeder routes, also operated by private concessionaires, 
complement these corridors. 
To date, three exclusive corridors totaling 35 kilometers in length have been built. 
Also, 22 feeder routes are in operation with a total extension of 66,7 kilometers covering 
over 40 neighborhoods of Bogotá. Infrastructure investments during this first stage totaled 
US$213 million.  The plan is to build up the systemin a period of 15 yearsto 22 central 
corridors (for a total extension of 388 kilometers) and with the capacity to transport 5 
million people daily. The total cost of the reform is estimated to be US$1,970 million.  
Institutionally, the project is organized around a publicly owned company, 
Transmilenio S.A., that designs the network, writes the contracts later tendered to private 
operators and administers the system. It is responsible for tendering the operation of the   27  
central corridors, the feeder routes and the ticketing and payments system. Tickets are 
based on a system of prepaid cards, also administered by a private concessionaire. The 
lanes, bus stops, terminals, pedestrian bridges and transfer stations were built and owned by 
the public sector. 
  Among the most salient features of the TransMilenio project are a network design 
with bus enclosed stops every 800 meters, with pedestrian bridges and other services. 
Modern vehicles especially designed for passenger service were introduced through the 
conditions stipulated in operators’ contracts. There are now 411 large articulated buses with 
automatic transmission systems, wheel suspension and modern natural gas o diesel motors 
operating in the central corridors, in addition to 147 standard buses on the feeder routes. A 
dual system of regular services (buses that alight at every stop with a frequency of 3 
minutes) and express services (stopping only at a subset of destinations and with a 
frequency of 4 minutes) was introduced. Schedules and routes are monitored by an 
electronic surveillance system based on a Satellite Positioning System and controlled by a 
specially created traffic control agency. 
  Perhaps one of the most important changes introduced through the reform was the 
compensation regime for operators. Operators are now paid according to the number of 
kilometers traveled and the quality of service. This facilitated a radical change in driver’s 
incentives; they are now under contract, work regular shifts and are not paid a bonus for 
passenger transported. The separation of the operation of buses and the collection of 
revenues was made possible by the introduction of the pre-paid ticketing system operated 
by the special revenue collection company. This eliminated overnight the ‘war of the cents’ 
radically improving traffic safety and quality of service. The electronic prepaid card system 
allows for tariff integration throughout the network   28  
In 2001, after one year of operation, the evaluation of the experience has been very 
positive. Average velocity in the main corridors rose from 12 Km/h and 18 Km/h (Calle 80 
and Avenida Caracas, respectively) to 26,7 Km/h after the project was in operation. As a 
consequence, average travel times fell by 32%, equivalent to a one hour saving daily for the 
average passenger.  
Safety and service quality have improved dramatically. Figure 1 shows the number 
of accidents, injuries and fatalities on the roads corresponding to the TransMilenio network 
in 1999─before the reform─and in 2001 after one year in operation. A significant reduction 
in the number of accidents, people injured or killed and assaults can be noted.    
 
 
Figure 1: Weekly traffic accidents, injuries, mortality and assaults 




Pollution levels have also dropped since the new system came into operation. Sulfur 
dioxide, SO2, average daily concentration levels dropped by 43% between January and 
March 2000 with the same months in 2001. Maximum daily concentration levels dropped 
by 54% (January) and 39% (March) comparing both years. Nitrogen Dioxide, NO2, average 
daily concentrations dropped by 13% (January) and 41% (March) , while maximum daily 
concentrations fell by 10% and 46%, respectively. For particular matter smaller than 10 
microns, the corresponding fall in average daily concentration levels was 31% (January) 
and 17% (March) and 16% and 13% in peak daily concentrations. Although its possible 
that other phenomenon (particularly climate differences) may account for these measured   29  
improvements, it is likely that the introduction of the TransMilenio plan was also 
responsible.       
As for the funding side of the reform, tariffs increased only 6% and most of the 
infrastructure investment was funded through petrol taxes, multilateral loans and other 
domestic sources. It must also be pointed out that the TransMilenio system currently 
accounts for only around 15% of bus trips in Bogotá. The vast majority of bus trips are still 
undertaken in the chaotic bus system outside TransMileno’s network.   
 
6. Conclusions 
The paper has shown the importance of correcting the “developed economy bias” 
typically found in the literature on urban transport.
45 The problems are indeed different in 
the two country groups. Direct competition in urban bus markets is rare in the developed 
world. The share of people using public transport, particularly buses, in urban areas, 
decreases with development—according to UN-habitat, 40.19% of the trips to work are 
done by bus in the lowest income countries vs. only 18.15% in OECD countries.  Finally, 
the ranking of the main policy issues relating to investment, network coverage and 
affordability of tariffs and other social considerations tend to very different between 
developing and developed economies.   
  Considering these differences,  the paper shows that under an emerging new hybrid 
model, the public authorities should consider more systematically a clear role in the 
determination of the network structure, service quality and frequencies, and force a 
separation between revenue collection and operating activities. However, unlike the 
traditional regulatory model, it is important for this emerging new model to continue   30  
recognizing the importance of efficiency concerns and of the role that private operators and 
modern regulatory instruments can have in meeting this objective.      
Although this hybrid scheme is a way to combine the benefits of a public monopoly 
with the benefits of increased competition allowed by private provision, there are several 
risks and prerequisites in developing such a transport system. First, the scheme requires the 
planning authority to be capable of defining the network configuration and service levels 
adequately. Otherwise, shortages may appear and the supply of transport services will not 
be able to meet demand levels or expected quality characteristics. Therefore, some 
institutional capacity is required to define these variables. In addition, it is important to 
leave some flexibility mechanism in place in order to change route design, or other service 
quality levels, after a particular contract has been awarded to a private operator. The 
required institutional capacity should also include the ability to manage the tendering 
system and monitor the contracts afterwards. 
Second, by restricting entry into the market, direct competition is loosened. Thus, 
companiesalthough privatemay not have sufficient incentives to increase productivity 
and control costs. The tendering of contracts avoids the problem. Tendering is in general to 
be preferred to negotiated contracts in this case both in terms of efficiency and equity 
outcomes. Additional safeguards can be provided through several regulatory instruments, 
including yardstick competition and offering a menu of contracts to potential operators. 
It is important to conclude by warning that reformers should never discount the risks 
of regulatory failure as a limitation to this hybrid model. If the middle road is not feasible, 
which of the two extreme cases (public monopoly or unregulated private provision) should 
be preferred? This will probably depend on a case-by-case basis, but the experience outside   31  
London and in Santiago, would tend to indicate that a competitive market is probably better 
for users. Insufficient institutional capacity implies that the efficient operation of a public 
monopoly will probably not be feasible either. For small urban areas where there are not 
many economies of density and services are not complex, the competitive model may 
however, require the introduction of selective public subsidies for the operation of 
unprofitable routes to maintain tariffs at levels consistent with the ability to pay of its users.        32  
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Figure 1: Weekly traffic accidents, injuries, mortality and assaults 
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1 See for instance,  Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer (1997)NERA and TIS.PT (2001). 
2  Although public transport in an urban area is also serviced by metro and light rail, it seems to be  fair to 
argue that the most pressing regulatory issues are related to bus services, at least in developing countries.  
3 See Gwilliam, Nash and Mackie (1985a; 1985b). Gómez-Ibañez and Meyer (1997), although not refuting 
the above consensus, argue that the empirical case against deregulation is not so strong.  
4 Although environmental regulations in this sector are important they will not be discussed here.  
5 Urban transport sector policymakers face many of the problems common to public utility regulation in 
general. Perhaps the only factor which makes urban transport regulation comparatively easier is the possibility 
of organizing competition for routes and the existence of competition from other modes of transport such as 
private cars and rail.  However, even this adds an additional complication to the regulation of this sector: the 
need to oversee potential anti trust issues. 
6 Cruz (2002). Taxi buses were smaller buses of 20 to 30 seats compared to the larger 40 seat buses.  
7 The tariff increased from CH$131 with a fleet of  5185 buses in 1979 to CH$267 in 1990 with  12,698 buses 
in 1990. By 2001, after a few years of decline in tariff, it picked up to reach the tariff CH$281 in 2001 with a 
fleet of  8,179. Note that until 1990, because tariffs were increasing, there were strong incentives to enter the 
sector in spite of the fact that low capacity utilization implied operating on a point high on the average cost 
curve. Therefore the true economic inference is that high prices induced excessive entry. However, once there 
was excess capacity in the sector it is curious that this did not induce price wars among operators. Possible 
reasons for this behavior will be discussed in the next section.    
8 Together with Mexico City, Santiago was the most polluted city in the region. In 1990, there were 95 days 
with particulate matter concentration levels above 150 µg/m
3, 30 days above 240 µg/m
3, and 6 days above 330 
µg/m
3 (CONAMA, 1998). For reference, in the United States the norm for daily concentrations of PM10 is 
150 µg/m
3, the same as in Chile. Thus for more than one third of the year, Santiago’s atmosphere did not meet 
national or international concentration norms in 1990.    
9 The authorities also directly retired close to 2,600 of the oldest buses in the system, paying close to US$14 
in compensation to bus owners (Cruz, 2002). 
10 The passenger data is from the origin destiny surveys undertaken by the government in 1991and 2001. 
11 Between 1990 and 1998, there was a total of 103 fatalities due to bus accidents. The highest year was 23, 
the lowers 2. For more details see Australian Transport Safety Bureau (2001) 
12 This interest group has used the threat of strikes repeatedly. The last strike, which drove Santiago to a 
standstill, occurred in August 2002. However, the event helped to show the importance of this sector as a 
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20 In 2002 the industry successfully lobbied for a change in the regulations that forced new buses to have 
automatic gears.   39  
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26 UN Centre for Human Development (2001), “Cities in a Globalizing World” 
27 The rest include walking, bicycle and others.  
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the bus, giving the driver the opportunity to reutilize the ticket and thus keep the extra fare without the risk of 
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